Twenty patientswith panicattacksandten controlswere givena standardisedinterviewabout thoughts occurringduring times of anxiety or panic attacks. The interviewer was blind to the subject's diagnosis.The 20 panic patients underwent a psychophysiological test battery which includeda cold pressortest, mental arithmetic task, and 5.5% CO2 inhalation. More patients than controlsreportedthoughts centred on fears of losingcontrol and shame when anxious. Panicpatientsratedtheir thoughtsas strongerand clearerthan did controlsandthey had more difficulty excludingthem from their minds. A feeling of anxiety preceded anxious thoughts in patients. This suggeststhat â€˜¿ faulty cognitions' are not the initialevent in a panic attack, althoughanxiousthoughts may exacerbateor maintainthem. Significantcorrelations were found between the intensity of anxiety-related thoughts in anticipation of mental arithmetic and changes in diastolic blood pressureand heart rate during mental arithmetic.
are characterised by â€˜¿ â€˜¿ overactive cognitive patterns (schema) relevant to danger that are continually structuring external and/or internal experience as a sign of dangerâ€• (Beck et al, 1985) . Psychophysi ological theories posit that panic attacks are the result of a positive feedback loop between bodily symptoms of anxiety and the individual's response to these symptoms (Lader, 1975; Goldstein & Chambless, Clark, 1986; Ehlers et a!, 1988; Van den Hout, 1988) . Internal cues are suggested as triggers for panic attacks. Cognitive processes such as the appraisal of bodily changes or environmental cues perceived as dangerous or as indicating loss of control are considered to be involved in the exacerbation of anxiety. Thus, in this model, a function of cognitions is amplification, leading to higher and higher states of arousal.
1978; Mathews et a!, 1981; Margraf et a!, 1986;
The role of cognitions in panic attacks is supported by retrospective interview studies (Beck et a!, 1974; Hibbert, 1984; Rapee, 1985; Ottaviani & Beck, 1987) . Patients with anxiety neurosis reported cognitions related to physical or psychological harm both before and during severe episodes of anxiety (Beck et a!, 1974) . Hibbert (1984) found similar results in 25 out patients with generalised anxiety or panic disorder.
Each of 30 patients with panic disorder interviewed by Ottaviani & Beck (1987) identified ideation centring on themes of physical, mental or behavioural catastrophes. Hibbert (1984) and Rapee (1985) found the cognitions of panic disorder patients during anxiety episodes to be more catastrophic than those of patients with generalised anxiety. In addition, the ideation of panic patients was more centred on internal physical and psychological harm, whereas generalised anxiety patients worried more about social rejection and failure.
Hibbert's study also dealt with the role of physical sensations as anxiety triggers. The most frequently reported sequence of events in panic attacks was the perception of an unpleasant body sensation (e.g., sweaty palms, dsypnoea, or palpitations), followed by anxious catastrophising cognitions and the full blown picture of a panic attack (Hibbert, 1984) . Similarly, Ley (1985) found that somatic symptoms preceded fear in the majority of patients interviewed Ottaviani & Beck (1987) reported that a misattribution of a physical sensation triggered panic in all their patients.
Since all these studies assessed cognition during panic retrospectively, the data depend on the patients' recollections of their attacks and are susceptible to bias. However, the results are very consistent and thus in line with cognitive or psychophysiological models. Thoughts related to personal danger, therefore, seem to be involved in the exacerbation of anxiety during panic attacks. The first purpose of our study was to replicate and extend Hibbert's (Hibbert, 1984) investigation of the ideational components of panic. Subjects in Hibbert's study were a mixture of generalised anxiety disorder patients and panic disorder patients with criteria as defined by the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC).
All patients in the present study met the DSMâ€"III--R criteria for panic disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) . We also added a control group. The second purpose of our study was to analyse the sequence of events of a typical episode of severe anxiety in both patients and control subjects.
Our third purpose was to test the hypothesis that the degree to which panic patients report being disturbed by anxiety-related cognitions is correlated with the degree of physiological arousal in anticipation of, and/or during, a stressful event.
Subjects
shown to be reliable and effective in eliciting the most important or troublesomethoughts during timesof anxiety (Hibbert, 1984) . Patients and controls were interviewed by telephone by one of two interviewers trained in the interview technique. Both interviewers were blind to the diagnostic status of the interviewee.
Interview
Hibbert designed the interview to elicit thoughts which had occurred during times of anxiety during the preceding three weeks. Following introductions and verbal permission to record the conversation, the interviewer said, â€oe¿ I would like you to try to tell me what thoughts have been going through your mind when you have been anxious or something has been making you anxious in the last three weeksâ€•. If this question elicited no thoughts, the subject was asked to recall the last time that he or she felt anxious and to describe the situation in detail. Following this description, the subject was asked to recall any thoughts that he or she was having at the time. If this failed to elicit any thoughts, the subject was asked to select a symptom which he or she associated with anxiety and was asked, â€oe¿ What does this symptom/feeling mean to you?â€•If the reported thoughts were not clearly verbalised, clarification questions were asked. For example, â€oe¿ Can you be more specific about the thought . . . ?â€oe or â€oe¿ Can you tell me what . . . means to you?â€• were used to clarify any ambiguities. Once a series of thoughts were elicited,the subjectwasaskedto pickthe threewhichseemed most important and to rank these three in order. Sub sequently, two independent raters blindly assigned each of thesethreethoughtsto one of sevencategories(illness, injury, death, losing control, failure, shame, and other) determined by Hibbert (1984) . A satisfactory level of inter-rater reliabilitywasattained(70%).Whentherewasno agreement, the thought was assigned to a category by consensus.
In order to determinethe rangeof thoughts, subjectswere asked whether they had had thoughts in the preceding three weeks which fit into six predetermined categories. As Hibbert (1984) points out, these categories are not meant to be â€˜¿ all inclusive', only to be similar to those indicated by Beck (1974) . Next, the quality of the most important thought was determined by asking the subject to rate this thought on an 11-point Lickert scale (0= â€˜¿ not at all' and 10= â€˜¿ completely' or â€˜¿ always') with respect to strength, clarity, credibility, frequency, and tenacity.
The subjects were then asked whether or not they had mental images when anxious in the last three weeks and, if so, a series of questions similar to those used for thoughts were asked in order to determine the range and quality of the most important image.The subjectswereasked to select from four choices about what happened when they started to get anxious. Similarly, they were asked to select from four choicesabout what happenedwhentheir anxietybegan to ease up. Next they were asked to describe briefly what a typical anxiety episode was like for them. Two raters, blind to whether the subject was a patient or a control, independently decided whether a physical sensation, cognition or emotional state occurred first. Inter-rater agreement (agreements divided by agreements plus dis agreements) was 83%.
Patient and control subjects were interviewed using patients be between 18 and 60 years of age, not pregnant, have at least one panic attack per week for the three weeks preceding entrance into the study, and have no active cardiopulmonary, renal, endocrine, or neurological disease.
Interviewswereconductedby clinicianswithspecialtraining and experience in the use of the Structured Clinical
Interview for Diagnosis (SCID). The age range of the patients was 22â€"50 years, with a mean age of 34.9 years and a standard deviationof 8.2. The mean scoreof patients on the Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale (Hamilton, 1959) was 17.8Â±8.0.
Ten control subjects were included in the study. These individuals were also recruited through local newspaper advertisements. In order to qualify for the study, controls wererequiredto scoreat or belowthe medianon both scales of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al, 1970) .The age range of the controls was 23â€"52 years, with a mean age of 36.5Â±11.1years. All controls were female and Caucasian, and were paid for their participation.
Procedure CategoryPatients (n = 60 thoughts)
% nControls
(n =30 thoughts) % nIllness18 (11)13 (4)Death7 Finally, the subjects were asked to rate the items on the Stanford Panic Appraisal Inventory (SPAI; Telch, 1984) . This instrument consists of 20 statements reflecting some commonfeelingsandthoughtsthatpeoplereportat times of fear and anxiety, and is rated using an 11-point Lickert-likescale (0= â€˜¿ not at all troubling' and 10= â€˜¿ extremely troubling').The itemswereselectedby asking a group of patients with panic to rank order their fivemost troublesome concerns with respect to panic from a larger list of possible items. Twenty items were selected which had the highestoverallranking.In an analysisof 100patients with panic disorder Browliard (1988) found a Chronbach alpha for internal consistency of 0.90. For testâ€"retestup to ten months r= 0.73 was obtained. The SPAI is also sensitive to treatment changes (Brouillard, 1988 ).
Thethreemostimportant thoughtsfromtheopen-ended interview and the three thoughts with the highest scores from the SPA! were used to create a six-statement instrument. This instrument was presented to patients during the physiological testing described below. The statements were listed in random order and rated on an 11-point Lickert scale (0= â€˜¿ not at all troubling' and 10= â€˜¿ extremely troubling').
Physiological testing
Only patients participated in this portion of the study. Patients received written instructions prior to each of the three test paradigms (cold pressor, mental arithmetic, and CÂ°2challenge). Instructions mentionedthe possibility that subjects might feel increases of anxiety with any of the stress tests. After reading the instructions, and in anticipation of the particular test, patients rated the intensity of their three most important interview thoughts and the three thoughts with the highest scores from the SPAI.
In order to minimise interpersonalinfluences, psycho

Resufts
Structured interview
The rater-determinedcategoriesof the three most important thoughtsprovidedby the patientscan be seen in Table I .
Patients reported significantlymore thoughts focusing on loss of self-control than did control subjects; controls had significantly more thoughts categorised by the raters as â€˜¿ other'. The subject-determinedrange of thoughts indicated that patients reported having significantly more thoughts of losing control and shame than did controls (Table II) . Only two controls reported thoughts centring on illness when they were anxious (P<0.08, patientsv. controls).
most important
Patients in Hibbert's study reported a slightly different pattern from patients in this study, with fewer of them worried about injury during the event and more worried about death. 
Questionnaire
Patients scored significantlyhigher on the SPAI than controls (85.0and 26.5, respectively;t=4.19, P=0.0003).
Physiological correlations
to the three stress tests (CO2 inhalation, cold pressor, mental arithmetic) were correlated with changes in systolic and diastolic blood pressureand changes in heart rate in the anticipation and stress periods. For this purpose, and for each of the stressors' changes, scores were calculated between the sum of the baseline values of these variables and the respective values during anticipation and stress. Correlations using sums of thought ratings yielded the same results as using either individual thoughts or weighted sums of thoughts (i.e.thevaluegivenbythepatient to thefirstthought multiplied by three, the value given to the second thought multiplied by 2, and the value given to the third thoughtmultipliedby 1prior to summingthe threethoughts).
The only significant correlation between the sum of anxiousthoughts and physiological parameters in anticipation of the three stresstestswasbetweenthe sum of the interview thoughts and the changes in diastolic blood pressure (r=0.46, P<0.05) in anticipation of mental arithmetic. Table IV showscorrelations betweenthe sums of scores given to the threeinterviewthoughts in anticipationof stress testing and the physiological parameters during each of the three stress tests. Significant correlations were obtained between the intensity of thoughts and changes in diastolic blood pressure and heart rate during mental arithmetic.
TABLE IV
Correlations between thought ratings in anticipation of stress testing and changes during stress testing *P<0.05. **p,(OOl 1. Sum of intensity scores (0â€"10) of three interview thoughts (I.T) or threeStanfordPanicAppraisalInventorythoughts(SPAI-T)before C02, mental arithmetic (MA) or cold pressor (CP). SBP=systolic blood pressure. DBP= diastolicblood pressure. HR = heart rate.
The ratingsgiven by patientsto the six thoughts (three interview, three highest scored fromSPA!) before exposure the SPA! (also in Table IV) .
Discussion
The first purpose of this study was to replicate and extend previous findings on ideation of patients with panic disorder (Hibbert, 1984; Rapee, 1985; Ottaviani & Beck, 1987) . We found, in concurrence with
Hibbert, that loss of control during times of anxiety is the most common thought in anxious patients.
Of Hibbert's 17 patients with panic attacks, eight
reported â€˜¿ most important thoughts' as having a heart attack (five subjects) or dying (three subjects). In our interview, only one out of 20 reported a thought so directly related to personal danger (â€˜I might have a heart attack') as â€˜¿ most important'. Further, on the 5PM, the items â€˜¿ I may have a heart attack' or â€˜¿ I may die' were endorsed as most important of the 20 items on the scale by only four patients.
This difference might be related to the method ologies of the interviews. Hibbert's (1984) and Beck et al's (1974) interviews with patients were conducted face to face; ours were conducted over the telephone.
A direct face-to-face interview with a clinician might produce a more anxious state in the subject and thus lead to more thoughts around the issues of personal danger. On the other hand, a telephone interview during which the subject was in familiar and â€˜¿ safe' surroundings might not predispose the subject to a state of high anxiety and thus might not bias the interview towards eliciting personal danger thoughts.
Indeed, several subjects commented that they felt more comfortable revealing details about themselves because the interview was not face to face. The significant differences between patients and controls on the SPA! further support the notion that patients and controls differ in cognitions. Using a cut-off of 50, the SPA! correctly identified 18 anxious patients and 9 controls. Thus, in this population, the SPA! was 90Â°losensitive and 90Â°lo specific.
Although the use of a control group is an improvement over other studies, a control group is subject to the same methodological problems of any self-report study. For both patients and controls, the data are retrospective and subject to recall and experimental demand bias. For instance, non anxious controls might be reluctant to report a feeling of losing control during anxiety even if they were having one. The second purpose of this study was to analyse the sequence of events of a typical episode of severe anxiety in both patients and controls. We found that both patients and controls most frequently reported a feeling of anxiety without a thought as the first event in an anxiety episode (70% for both). There were no differences in either of the other three choices by percentage (a thought without a feeling of anxiety, both a thought and feeling at the same time, or don't know). Hibbert found that 53% of his subjects with panic attacks reported a feeling of anxiety without a thought as the first event in an episode of anxiety.
The analysis of the brief descriptions of an episode of anxiety by both patients and controls also supported this finding for patients. In 85% of the patients, a bodily event was the initial awareness of anxiety. It appears that bodily symptoms usually precede other events in anxious patients. This suggests that most of the time â€˜¿ faulty cognitions' are not the initial event in a panic attack, although they may exacerbate or maintain it.
The third purpose of the present study was to test the hypothesis that the degree to which panic patients report being disturbed by anxiety-related cognitions is significantly correlated with the degree of physiological arousal in anticipation of and during stressful events. We found that the most important thought at one time is not necessarily the most important thought at another. In anticipation of the CO2 inhalation test, patients did not report the thought that they had indicated during the telephone interview as most troublesome at times of anxiety.
The same result occurred in anticipation of the cold pressor test. These data suggest that the â€˜¿ most important thought' varies from one situation to another, either because thoughts are situationally specific or because an underlying anxious state of mind may predispose to anxious thoughts (Horowitz  et a!, 1983) . Finally, the physiological aspect of this study showed us that the reactivity to physical stressors (cold water and C02) did not correlate significantly with an increase in troublesome thoughts either in anticipation of or during these stress tests. The stressors may have produced as yet undefined non stress-related physiological changes which overrode whatever effect cognitions had in producing physiological change. The only significant correlation between change in physiology in response to a stressor and intensity of troublesome thoughts was found in anticipation of and during the mental arithmetic test. Thus the intensity of cognition was only significantly related to physiological changeinthe condition where there was no external stimulus, such as cold water or inhaled CO2, driving the physiology.
The results of our work have several implications for the assessment and treatment of panic disorder. First, a paper and pencil test, the SPA!, can be used to differentiate between patients with high anxiety and controls, and presumably would serve as a good outcome measure of changes in cognition in appropriate populations. Second, a focus on security and control issues in the context of therapy might have significant impact on reducing anxiety states which, left to escalate, can and do culminate in panic attacks. These findings are consistent with the cognitive interventions suggested by Beck and Emery (Beck et a!, 1985) and with the psychophysiological model which suggests that a positive feedback loop, with thoughts as one component of the loop, is responsible for culmination of an anxiety state in a full-blown panic attack.
Third, more studies are needed to delineate the phenomenology of anxiety states as they develop over time. Specifically, chronological monitoring of behaviour, physiology, cognition and bodily symptoms might reveal patterns representing discrete panic attacks and anxious states of mind. Further, this kind of monitoring might elucidate whether or not there is a predictable sequence among these anxiety components.
